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Abstract
An economic model of the evolution of the gender performance ratio in individual 
sports**
This paper shows that gender world record ratio in four disciplines, i.e. marathon, triple 
jump, pole vault and 800 meters, follows a S-shape over time. It is argued that this 
pattern is initiated by a sudden drop in the social barrier for women to participate in 
these disciplines. This drop in social barrier materializes -later- by the authorization for 
women to participate at major events, such as the Olympic Games, in these disciplines. 
The paper builds a simple economic model of sector self-selection and human capital 
accumulation with intrinsic disutility (social barriers) to participate in some sectors. 
As social barriers are removed in a sector, the Gender Performance Ratio is show to 
follow a S-shape over time under very basic assumptions and calibrations. Ability self-
selection, measured as the difference between mean ability of women in that sector and 
population mean, becomes more positive after removal of the social barrier.
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1 Introduction
In the vast majority of individual sports, the performance of women rela-
tive to men has increased over time. For instance, as shown in Figure 1, the
Gender World Record Ratio (GWRR hereafter) in many individual sports in-
cluding speed skating, athletics (running and jumping disciplines) and swim-
ming has increased since the early 1900s. The main reason for this pattern is
the increased participation of women in sports activities and in particular in
major sports events such as the Olympic games (OG) as depicted in Figure
2 (IOC, 2009). However, the evolution of the GWRR has not been uniform
across disciplines. Zooming in on Figure 1, two groups of disciplines can be
distinguished. The rst group contains disciplines for which the evolution
has roughly followed a constant trend over time, the left panel of Figure
3, whereas the second contains (athletics) disciplines, i.e. triple jump, pole
vault, marathon and to a lesser extent 800 meters, for which the evolution
of the GWRR follows a S-shape over time, the right panel of Figure 3.1
The question arises why the GWRR in the second group has followed a
1Note that this S-shape is not an artifact of world records in these disciplines but
is also observed for other measures of performance as well. For instance, focussing on
Marathon, Figure 4 indicates that the evolution of the GWRR is very similar to that of
the gender year best performance ratio or even the ratio of gender winning time at the
Boston marathon.
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S-shape. Formalizing the problem a bit, write pit = bthit the performance
at time t of an athlete i with ability hit using technology bt > 0. Denote,
ht = maxifhitg the ability of the best athlete at t. The world record at time
t is by denition wrt = max<t

bh
	
. The world record is broken at time
T if and only if bThT > max<T

bh
	
. This highlights two candidates to
explain the S-shape evolution of the GWRR in the right panel of Figure 3:
gender biased technical change (gender specic changes in bt) or increased
ability of women (gender specic changes in ht). The rst explanation implies
that the new techniques or technologies that have been introduced in these
four disciplines have favored women relative to men while the second implies
that the ability of women started increasing sharply relative to men.2
Although gender biased technical change could have led to such a di¤er-
ential behavior of the GWRR across events over time, this explanation has
limited scope in practice for at least three reasons. First, long jump and
2In a related paper, Munasinghe et al. (2001) nd that the evolution of world record
breaking in Track and Field is similar to the evolution of US record breaking arguably
local records set with xed population. Munasinghe et al. argue that this evidence stems
for the prominent role played by technological progress in the evolution of world record
breaking as opposed to globalization. However, one can easily argue that 1) a signicant
share of world records in Track and Field are also US records and more important that 2)
athletes breaking the US records are usually athletes competing at international competi-
tion (world championships, Olympics etc.) and therefore subject to increased competition
among athletes following from the globalization and leading to increased human capi-
tal investments (increased training load, better nutrition, more massages, etc.), factors
acknowledged in Munasinghe et al. as being part of the technological progress.
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triple jump are very similar events as far as technique and technology are
concerned and yet only triple jump has witnessed a S-shape evolution of the
GWRR. Second, although major changes in technology have occurred in the
second group (S-shape group), the timing of these technological changes do
not coincide with the timing of the S-shape in GWRR. For instance, the most
important technological development in pole vault was the introduction of
glass ber poles in 1961. This occurred about 25 years before the GWRR
started increasing sharply. Third, major changes in techniques occurred in
events belonging to the rst group too, i.e. without a S-shape evolution of
the GWRR. For instance, the introduction of the Fosbury op in 1968 is con-
sidered to be the major change in technique at high jump and this change
has not a¤ected signicantly the GWRR at high jump.
The main source of di¤erences in the evolution of the GWRR between
disciplines in the left panel and (athletic) disciplines in the right panel must
therefore be linked to a sharp increase in the ability of women athletes in these
four disciplines. This could have materialized through i) self-selection: better
women athletes started participating in these disciplines, and/or ii) greater
human capital investments of women in these disciplines: women athletes
in these disciplines started to train more/harder. The question remains why
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womens self-selection and human capital investments behavior have changed
so much in these disciplines and not in others.
The answer to this question is linked to historical events related to womens
participation at major events and in particular the OG or the World Cham-
pionships (WC).3 Although womens participation at the OG started in 1900
with Tennis and Golf and was followed by swimming events in 1912,4 it is not
until 1928 that women were allowed to participate at athletics events. Even
then, womens participation was limited to some disciplines such as short
distance running, high jump and long jump.5 Similarly, although the par-
ticipation of women at the athletics European Championships (EC) started
in 1938 in Vienna and were combined with mens championships in 1946 in
Oslo, only short run distances, long jump and high jump were programmed.
Womens participation at the 800 meters would only occur in 1954 and 1960
for the EC and OG respectively. Womens marathon was introduced in 1982
for the EC and 1984 for the OG. Beyond the OG and EC events, women
3Note that the OG served as world championships until 1983 when the rst independent
world championships were organized in Helsinki.
4In 1912, only one individual swimming event was organized for women, the 100 meters
freestyle. In 1920, women could also swim the 300 meters free style and as of 1924 women
could compete on the same distances and styles as men, except for the 1500 meters. In
1968, the 800 meters was created for women.
5The 800 meters was on the program of the 1928 Olympics but 3 women collapsed
during the race which led to a general opinion that women could not safely run long
distances, (Leigh and Bonin, 1974).
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had to wait until 1971 to be allowed to run the New York City marathon
and one year later the Boston marathon. Similarly, womens triple jump and
pole vault were only ratied by the International Association of Athletics
Federations (IAAF) in 1990 and 1992 respectively. Triple jump appeared at
the EC and OG for the rst time in 1994 and 1996 respectively; pole vault
in 1998 and 2000 respectively.6
In this paper, I build a (simple) economic model to explain the S-shape
evolution of the GWRR in the second group of disciplines from a sudden drop
in the disutility to participate in these disciplines. The three key ingredients
of this model are i) sector (or discipline) self-selection as in Roys model (Roy,
1951), ii) disutility (expected gains or intrinsic) di¤erential across sectors and
iii) sector specic human capital investments. Intuitively, if abilities across
sectors are positively correlated, the model explains the S-shape evolution of
the GWRR in the second group of disciplines as follows. The social barrier
for women to practice these disciplines, that is partially materialized in their
non authorization to participate at major events generates disutility, either
6Also, one might wonder why we do not observe a S-shape evolution of the GWRR at
speed skating events while speed skating events for women were only organized for the rst
time at the 1960 winter OG. The answer is simply that although womens participation
at the winter OG came on late, the International Skating Union had been organizing
the World All-round Speed Skating Championships for Women since 1936 and uno¢ cial
Championships were already held in the years 1933-1935.
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in terms of expected income (prizes but also sponsorship) or intrinsic, for
women to specialize in these disciplines. As a result, more talented female
athletes will select other disciplines and/or womens investments in human
capital specic to these disciplines will be lower than that of men. How-
ever, as soon as the social barrier drops, the disutility to specialize in these
disciplines vanishes. This induces a change in the distribution of women
over disciplines. Moreover, new generations of women will invest more in de-
veloping human capital specic to these disciplines which will lead each new
generation of women selecting into these disciplines to have more human cap-
ital than previous generations and hence higher performance. The GWRR
will consequently increase up until generations born after the drop of the so-
cial barrier in these disciplines have become athletes. The GWRR will then
atten as it reaches its new steady state. It is crucial to bare in mind that the
authorization of women to participate at major events does not necessarily
correspond to the timing of the drop in social barrier in the model. In fact,
it is most likely that the drop in social barrier occurs a decade or more be-
fore women become authorized to participate at major events. For instance,
women authorization to participate at the NYC marathon proceeded by 13
years the authorization for women to participate at the OG marathon. Sim-
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ilarly, the authorization for women to participate at the OG triple jump and
pole vault events followed by about a decade the ratication by the IAAF of
these disciplines for women.
It can be shown through simple calibration of the model that the model
predicts a S-shape evolution of GWRR over time with 18-year window of
increase in a sector for which social barriers vanish. The model also predicts
that selection, as measured by the di¤erence in performance between women
selecting a sector and women in the population, into the sector for which
social barriers drop is becoming more positive over time and follows a S-
shape too.
The model also makes an important prediction about the timing of the
drop in social barrier in a sector. The model predicts indeed that the end
of the window of increase will occur when the generation born just after the
drop of the social barrier reaches the age at which performance in that sector
peaks. The year of the drop in social barrier is therefore given by subtracting
the age of peak performance in that sector to the year corresponding to the
end of the window of increase.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. The next section
presents the model and illustrates the main feature of the model with a simple
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calibration. Section 3 concludes and discusses the relationship between the
model developed in this paper and the literature on the evolution of the GPR.
2 Model
2.1 Set up
Consider an economy where individuals live for A years. As in the standard
human capital model, individuals invest full time in human capital early in
life, say until a with 0 < a < A, and then engage full time in consumption
generating activities until they die at A.
For simplicity assume there are two sectors of activities only. Without
loss of generality, think of sector 1 as a sector with potential social barriers,
dened below as intrinsic disutility specic to sector 1, and sector 2 as a
sector without such social barriers. For instance, sector 1 could be any of the
disciplines in the right panel of Figure 3, say triple jump, and sector 2 any
disciplines in the left panel, say long jump. Another noteworthy example is
one where sector 1 is paid work and sector 2 home production, in which case
the model can be used to describe the evolution of the Gender Pay Ratio
(GPR) over time.
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Let individuals be born with endowed stock of human capital of two
types, i.e. h10 and h20, and let '(h10; h20) and (h10; h20) be the PDF and
CDF respectively. Assume further that COV (h10; h20)  0. Let the initial
distribution be constant over time and hence across age cohorts. Denote
hja, j = 1; 2, human capital of type j at age a. Let sja be the time spent
accumulating human capital of type j at age a with s1a+s2a = 1 for all a < a
and sja = 0 for a  a.
The accumulation of human capital of type j through study is given by
gj(hja 1)sja. The evolution of the stock of human capital is not only driven
by human capital investments but also by appreciation  early in life  and
depreciation  late in life  over the life-cycle given by j + j2 a. The change
in the stock of human capital of type j is thus given by:
_hja = gj(hja 1)sja 1 + j +
j
2
a
Let tja be the time spent working in sector j at age a with t1a + t2a = 1
if a  a and t1a = t2a = 0 else. Let an individuals utility7 at age a be
Ua = (f1(h1a; a) B1(h1a)) t1a + f2(h2a; a)t2a where fj(x; a) is the (per unit
7Any convex function of (f1(h1a; a) B1(h1a)) t1a and (f2(h2a; a) B2(h2a)) t2a will
yield a corner solution tja = 1 and tka = 0, j 6= k.
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of time) productivity/consumption of workers with x units of human capital
of type j at age a and, B1(x) indicates (per unit of time) social barrier leading
to disutility of working in sector 1 for an individual with x units of human
capital of type 1.
At age a  a, utility maximizing individuals specialize and engage full
time in either sector 1 or 2 depending on U1a R U2a. The problem for an
individual born with human capital h10 and h20 is therefore to choose sja
and tja, j = 1; 2 for all a  A to maximize life-cycle utility. Formally the
problem reads as:
max
sja;tja
AZ
a
e tUada
so that :
Ua = (f1(h1a; a) B1(h1a)) t1a + f2(h2a; a)t2a
t1a = t2a = 0 if a < a
t1a + t2a = 1 if a  a
s1a + s2a = 1 if a < a
s1a = s2a = 0 if a  a
_hja = gj(hja 1)sja + j +
j
2
a
where  is the discount rate.
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The solution to this problem can be obtained using optimal control tech-
niques although, even for this simple model, general closed form solutions are
unlikely to exist. However, the essence of the model and its application to
the GWRR is best understood with further simplications and in particular
with assumptions 1 and 2 below.
Condition 1 Monotonicity in human capital accumulation across sectors
after a: 1 = 2 =  and 1 = 2 = , so that h1a > h2a for all a > a if
h1a > h2a.
Condition 2 Monotonicity in utility across sectors. fj(:; :) and B1(:) are
functions so that f1(h1a; a)   B1(h1a) > f2(h2a; a) for all a < a  A if
h1a > h2a.
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that individualsoptimal career path is to
work each year in the same sector provided the economy remains unchanged
over the life cycle. Indeed, we have f1(h1a; a)   B1(h1a) > f2(h2a; a) for all
A  a > a if h1a > h2a. Dene hja (hja) as the stock of human capital at age
a if one invests full time in ability of type j (respectively k), that is, if sja = 1
(respectively 0) for all a  a. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that individuals
will invest full time in accumulating human capital of type 1 and work full
13
time in sector 1 if f1(h1a; a)   B1(h1a) > f2
 
h2a; a

. Note that this choice
depends on: (h10; h20), gj(:), fj(:; :) and B1(:).
2.2 Calibration
As an illustration, I calibrate the model assuming that initial stock of human
capital follows a bivariate normal distribution with mean (2; 0:95  2) and
variance covariance matrix  =
0BB@ 1 0:95
0:95 0:952 + 0:92
1CCA.8 The production
function is assumed to be similar in both sectors and linear in human capital
with unitary slope. The stock of human capital is assumed to increase by 0.05
units per unit of time invested and does not vary with age (no appreciation
nor depreciation over the life cycle,  =  = 0). The initial social barrier
increases linearly in the stock of human capital of type 1 with slope equal to
8Note that the S-shape can be generated with low (though positive) correlation between
abilities. It generally depends on the initial position of the selection line with respect to
the distribution of inate abilities, i.e. depends on (:; :), gj(:), fj(:) and B1(:). Such
examples are available from the author upon request.
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1/3. This is summarized as follows:
h20  N(2; 1) and e  N(0; 1)
h10 = 0:95h20 + 0:9e
gj(hja) = 0:05 for j = 1; 2
fj(hja; a) = hja
B1(h1a) =
B   1
B
 h1a with B = 1:5
a = 19
Note that this calibration satises assumptions 1 and 2, guaranteeing no
switching sectors over the life-cycle (at given gj, fj and Bj). This means that
individuals will select sector 1 over sector 2 and remain in that sector over
the life cycle, provided the economy does not change, if h1a > B  h2a, that
is if their maximum stock of human capital of type 1 at age a = 19 exceeds
B times their maximum stock of human capital of type 2. Figure 5 depicts
this self-selection given the calibration of the model above. The gure plots
the distribution of (h1a; h2a) together with the selection line h1a = B  h2a.
Those individuals lying above (below) the line select sector 1 (respectively
2). The gure also shows how a drop in social barriers B from 1.5 to 1 will
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lead to a twist clockwise in the selection line, inducing some individuals with
relatively high type 1 human capital to switch from sector 2 to sector 1.
Within age cohorts, the highest productivity in sector 1 is determined by
the productivity of the worker supplying the highest stock of type 1 human
capital. Collecting the highest productivity in sector 1 for each age cohort
yields the highest productivity age prole in sector 1 as plotted in Figure 6.
Given our assumptions about human capital depreciation and production,
this prole is concave and reaches a maximum at 33 years old. In this cal-
ibration, this means that the world record in sector 1 is set at about 7.28
prior to the drop in social barriers by a worker aged 33.
Suppose that prior to T = 0, the economy is so that B = 1:5. At time
T = 0, B drops unexpectedly from 1:5 to 1. Figure 7 shows the actual
distribution of human capital the cohort of individuals aged 19 at T = 0 so
that these individuals have made their human capital decisions prior to the
drop in the social barrier. Within this cohort, those with h1a > Bh2a have
invested full time type 1 human capital and therefore moved up compared to
their initial position in the distribution of human capital '(h10; h20) whereas
those with h1a  B  h2a have invested full time in type 2 human capital
and therefore moved to the right compared to their initial position in the
16
distribution of human capital '(h10; h20).
Without the drop in social barrier B, individuals that invested in type j
human capital would have selected sector j. However, since B drops, utility
in sector 1 increases relative to sector 2 and this especially for individuals with
high type 1 human capital. Going back to the cohort aged 19 at T = 0, Figure
8 shows that the drop in B will induce some individuals to switch from sector
2 to sector 1. Call these individuals "switchers 0". Although "switchers 0"
have not invested in type 1 human capital, they have a relatively high initial
stock. Note that Figure 8 could be generated for all cohorts of individuals
19 or older at T = 0, and a similar pattern would be observed. This means
that for all cohorts of individuals aged 19 or more at T = 0, we can collect
the highest productivity in sector 1 for "switchers 0" and plot the highest
productivity age prole of "switchers 0" as in Figure 9. Whether this prole
is above or below the prole of those that would also have selected sector 1
without the drop in social barriers, that is whether a new world record will
be set at T = 0, depends on the calibration of the model.
However, this is not the most interesting feature of the model. The im-
portant mechanism put forward in this model however is that in contrast to
cohorts older than 19 at T = 0, cohorts younger than 19 at T = 0 have (lim-
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ited) time to adjust their human capital investments before entering either
sectors of activity. For instance, the cohort aged 18 at T = 0, has still one
year to invest in human capital. Among those that invested full time in type
2 human capital until T = 0, those with relatively high innate stock of type
1 human capital might nd it protable to invest their last year full time in
developing type 1 human capital. Call these individuals "switchers 1". At
T = 1, three groups of workers can be distinguished in sector 1: i) workers
aged between 19 and A that invested full time in type 1 human capital, ii)
"switchers 0" now aged between 20 and A and iii) "switchers 1" aged 19 that
invested 18 years in type 2 human capital and only their last year in type 1
human capital. Figure 10 indicates for each group the highest productivity
age prole. As calibrated the world record at T = 1 is unchanged.
At T = 2, four groups of workers can be distinguished in sector 1: i)
workers aged between 19 and A that invested full time in type 1 human
capital, ii) "switchers 0" now aged between 21 and A, iii) "switchers 1" now
aged 20 and "switchers 2" aged 19 that invested 17 years in type 2 human
capital and only their last 2 years in type 1 human capital. Figure 11 indicates
for each of these groups the highest productivity age prole. As calibrated
the world record at T = 2 is unchanged.
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We can go on until the world record will nally be broken. In our calibra-
tion this will happen at T = 15, 15 years after the drop in B. As depicted
in Figure 12, the WR will be broken by the best "switcher 4" at the age of
30 years old.
It should be clear that each new generation will have workers with poten-
tially higher innate ability that also invested more in type 1 human capital.
This means that the WR will continue to shift each year until the best worker
of the generation born at T = 0 will reach the top of her productivity age
prole, at age 33 in our calibration. This means that the WR record will
shift each year between T = 15 and T = 33 which corresponds to a window
of 18 years of increase. This pattern is depicted in Figure 13. It should also
be noted that selection, as measured by the di¤erence between the mean per-
formance (human capital of type 1) among those that select sector 1 and the
population mean, will increase over time. This pattern is depicted in Figure
14 for the calibration above.
2.3 Predictions of the model
The model makes an important prediction about the timing of the end of
the window of increase in the S-shape evolution of the WR. The end of the
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window depends on the age at which performance peaks, say a+  in the
calibration, a+ = 33 . Let the age at which athletes have established the
current WRs in the four disciplines characterized with a S-shape be a proxy
for a+. Table 1 reports values of a+ in our 4 disciplines ranging from 27 to 32
years. Using data on the evolution of the GWRR we can estimate the year
corresponding to the end of the window and hence the year of the drop in
social barrier for each event by simply subtracting to the year of the end of
the window our proxy for a+. As reported in Table 1, the implied year of the
drop of social barrier is 1955 for marathon or 16 years before women were
authorized to run the NYC marathon and 29 years before women could run
the marathon at the OG. Similarly, for Pole vault, the implied year T = 0 is
1981 or 11 years before the discipline was ratied by the IAAF and 15 (19)
years before the event was organized at the EC (OG respectively) for the
rst time.
3 Summary and discussion
This paper shows that the evolution of the GWRR has not been uniform
across disciplines in individual sports. While for most disciplines a linear
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closing of the gender ratio is observed, four disciplines, the 800 meters, pole
vault, triple jump and marathon, exhibit a S-shape evolution over time. This
paper argues that this pattern is initiated by a sudden drop in the social
barrier for women to participate in these four disciplines. This drop in social
barrier can be linked to historical events related to womens participation at
major events and in particular the OG or the WC in these disciplines.
The paper builds a simple economic model of sector self-selection and
human capital accumulation with intrinsic disutility (social barriers) to par-
ticipate in some sectors. It is shown that as social barriers are removed in
a sector, the Gender Performance Ratio follows a S-shape over time under
very basic assumptions and calibrations. Ability self-selection, measured as
the di¤erence between mean ability of women in that sector and population
mean, becomes more positive after removal of the social barrier.
This paper is related to the literature on the Gender Pay Gap. As de-
picted in Figure 15, the US Gender Pay Ratio (GPR) has followed a S-shape
over the last 5 decades similar to that of the GWRR in the 800 meters, pole
vault, triple jump and marathon. Recently, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008)
have shown that this shape is in fact due to a change in the selection of women
into paid employment. The selection of women into paid work has become
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more positive over time. MR08 attributes the change in self-selection to the
rise in within gender wage inequality that occurred simultaneously with the
S-shape of the GPR. In Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008)s view, successive
changes in the return to labor market skills successively induced women with
more of these skills to enter the labor market leading to successive increases
in the GPR.
This paper proposes an alternative explanation for the changes in the
self-selection into paid work of women and the resulting S-shape of the GPR.
In the model outlined in this paper, a drop in the barriers to entry in a sector
at T will lead to successive changes in i) the distribution of human capital in
that sector (and other sectors too) and ii) self-selection leading to a S-shape
in the GPR. The new equilibrium will be reached, i.e. human capital, self-
selection and GPR will remain constant, as soon as the generation of women
born at T will enter the labor market.
Evidence from athletic disciplines such as 800 meters, pole vault, triple
jump and marathon seems to point toward World War II and the women
liberation movement of the 60s as an explanation for the change in self-
selection into paid employment observed in the labor market in the 70s and
80s and the ensuing S-shape in the GPR. The line of thoughts would be that
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followingWWII and the women liberation movement of the 60s, labor market
participation of women has increased, generation after generation, providing
new generations of women with more incentives to invest in labor market
skills. Each new generation of women has therefore entered the labor market
with more skills than the previous leading to more positive self-selection and
a S-shaped GPR. However, since human capital investments of all generations
of women born after the liberation movement of women will be similar, the
GPR of these generations will also be similar explaining the attening out of
the GPR since the mid 90s.
To make the link between the GPR and the GWRR clearer, it is important
to note that the above discussion about self-selection holds for all quantiles.
The GPG at all quantiles can be decomposed into a true gender pay gap
and a selection e¤ect, i.e. the di¤erence in abilities between women at the
 th quantile of the distribution of working women relative to women at the
 th quantile of the distribution in the population. Figure 16 clearly shows a
S-shape for the median, the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile.9 The end
of the window for the 95 percentile is in the mid-90s and since women-hourly
9Higher quantiles than the 95th are tricky to interpret since the CPS march supplements
are topcoded with the share of topcoded observations in the vicinity of 2 to 3% of the
selected samples.
23
wages at the 95 percentile peak at 52 years old, as indicated in Figure 17,
the implied year of the drop in social barrier is 1995  52 = 1943.
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